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Justice White and the Yale Legal Realists
The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfert
An old friend, classmate, sometime colleague, and unabashed admirer must
defer to scholars and historians for any thoroughly objective evaluation of the
work of Justice Byron White over his thirty-one-year tenure on the Supreme
Court. For one thing, in recent years, Justice White graded my papers (and I
didn't always pass).' But some anecdotal recollections of Justice White and
some observations about his role on the Court may be of interest to scholars,
historians, and others. The Yale Law Journal and his retirement provide an
appropriate place and time for them.
On June 27, 1936, at Franklin Field in Philadelphia, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt described "a mysterious cycle in human events. To some generations
much is given. Of other generations much is expected. This generation of
Americans has a rendezvous with destiny."' 2 At that time Byron White was in
college. He and his contemporaries were eyewitnesses to the Great Depression.
College students of the era knew well the national effort to reverse and contain
it and knew that the Supreme Court seriously interfered with that effort, only
to relent when the President attempted to pack the Court and, ultimately, filled
fortuitous vacancies with new faces.3
As the Depression waned, war loomed. In a foreword to the Yale Law
Journal's fiftieth anniversary issue, Professor Arthur L. Corbin recognized the
post-Depression, prewar mood, observing
the effects of economic and political conflict-the struggle for
survival and for power between state and nation, between the written
constitutional word and the radical innovation impatient of the rule of
the dead hand, between organized labor and incorporated capital.
No man can foresee the changes of a second half century...
Will the surging tides of war, economic and military, between classes
and parties and races and peoples, allow continued existence to a law
t Senior Judge, United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
1. See, e.g., Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988), rev'g 648 F. Supp. 1234 (D.D.C.
1986).
2. THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1936, at 235 (1938).
3. As Professor Walton Hamilton put it a few years later: "An institution had been saved by a narrow
margin; an ominous go-and-sin-no-more was the price of salvation." Valton H. Hamilton & George D.
Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 YALE L.J. 1319, 1322 (1941).
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journal, or a university, or an Anglo-American system of law and
government?
4
On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland and set off World War
II. Later that month the Class of 1942 entered Yale Law School. Shortly
thereafter, Byron White joined the class. He had returned from England with
American Rhodes Scholars who were evacuated when the war began.
Classmates anticipated him with awe and apprehension-a Rhodes Scholar and
Phi Bete from the West who was also a college All-American triple-threat5
back and, more recently, Rookie of the Year and leading ground-gainer in the
National Football League, recruited and coached by the legendary John
McNally (who played and coached under the assumed name of "Johnny
Blood"). However, White quickly established himself as a serious but
unassuming, friendly fellow who was as ready as the next for fun and games:
squash at the Payne-Whitney gym, tape-measure home runs in pick-up softball
games, movies, and endless bull sessions-beer was neither forbidden nor
neglected.
Contemporaries recall White the student as a fixture in the library, arriving
early, leaving late, a picture of total concentration.6 They also recall his
classroom performances: invariably and thoroughly prepared, having mastered
all the cases assigned for the day plus the footnotes and, more often than not,
the cases cited in the footnotes. Students and surviving professors still mention
White's formidable jousting with professors, who were sometimes not as well-
prepared or resourceful as he.
At the post-Depression, pre-Pearl Harbor Law School, classes came under
the influence of a remarkable faculty, animated by two generations of the Yale
school of legal realists.7 Indeed, Professor William 0. Douglas, a leader of the
legal realists of the time, would have become the Law School Dean in 1939
but for his appointment to the Supreme Court in the spring of that year.6
There was Arthur L. Corbin, one of the pioneer legal realists:9 he taught the
common law of contracts, fact by fact and case by case, the abstractions
seasoned by flashbacks to his stint as a practitioner in Cripple Creek,
Colorado. Then in his mid-sixties, Corbin played a steady first base and batted
cleanup for the faculty softball team.
4. Arthur L. Corbin, The First Half-Century, 50 YALE L.J. 740, 741-42 (1941).
5. A triple threat can run, pass, and punt.
6. The late Justice Potter Stewart, a member of the class of 1941, reportedly recalled that he "often
saw White in the library in his steel-rimmed glasses, only to read about him in the next day's paper as the
game-winning 'Whizzer White.' To Stewart and his classmates, White was both Clark Kent and Superman."
BOB WOODWARD & ScOT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1979).
7. See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 80 (1986).
8. Id. at 138.
9. For a sketch of Professor Corbin's role in the school of legal realism, see WILLIAM TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 26-40 (1973).
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Leader of a younger generation of legal realists was Myres McDougal,
himself a Rhodes Scholar. His mellifluous Mississippi accent failed to mask
a lightning-quick mind and tongue or to dampen his exposure of platitudes of
judges-and students. His jousting colloquies with White are still-remembered
classics.
Others were also vital elements of the chemistry of the place. Harry
Shulman, later Dean, a protege of his former professor and then recently
appointed Justice Felix Frankfurter, taught torts. Still echoing in memory is the
slight foreign accent with which Professor Shulman pronounced "Palsgraf"'
and "Touche Niven"" as he demonstrated how common-law judges like
Benjamin Cardozo adapted that law to changing circumstances.
Professor Underhill Moore, also an early fact-focused legal realist, having
exhausted all the students' explanations of the whys and wherefores of a
check, would furiously slap his desk, shouting: "Don't you know by now! A
check is a check!" Walton Hamilton, the imaginative preacher's-son-turned-
economist, and nonlawyer member of the Georgia Bar solely by act of the
legislature, taught a unique and provocative course entitled "Public Control of
Business," focusing on antitrust policy, if not law.
White himself has eulogized sharp, quick Professor Wesley Sturges with
a description of his classroom style that remarkably resembles almost any
Supreme Court practitioner's account of a colloquy with Justice White: "His
insistent, driving analysis was a kind of classroom surgery which produced
exceedingly thin slices of case, principle and judge, so thin that they were
transparent to even the dimmest eye.'
' 2
Last, and shortest, but not least was Professor James William Moore,
former cowhand, boxer (probably flyweight), clerk of the District Court of
Montana, and a right hand to Dean/Judge Charles E. Clark, a principal
draftsman of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938. J.W., as he was
known, had a rough-and-ready teaching style, often enlivened by tough but
amiable jibing with White. Each student stood to recite; uncertain ones were
sharply (but with a smile) admonished to "make a noise like a lawyer."
Questioners who threatened to seize the upper hand in a dialogue were
sometimes told to "see my book" for the solution.
The 1940-41 academic year coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the
Yale Law Journal. The Yale faculty contributed fifteen of the thirty-two
articles that appeared in Volume 50, including three by Professor Corbin, 3
10. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
11. Ultmmares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
12. Byron R. White, To Students, the Deftness of a Master Surgeon, 18 U. MIAMI L. RE'V. 1, 1 (1963)
[hereinafter White, To Students].
13. Corbin, supra note 4; Arthur L. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762 (1941);
Arthur L. Corbin, William Reynolds Vance, 50 YALE L.J. 195 (1940).
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three by Professor Hamilton, 4 and a stirring rendition of legal realism by
Professor McDougal. 5 These articles reflect the academic climate that the
Class of 1942 experienced.
One of Professor Corbin's papers ranged outside his special field of
contracts to address Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.' 6 He made an elegant legal
realist's plea to judges whom Erie required to administer state law in federal
court to ensure that
every litigant's day in court shall be a day in a real court of justice,
a court that consults "all the available data" and reaches its decision
as to his rights by that high judicial process that has made
constitutions and statutes and the common law render a living service
according to the changing needs of men. This is the "judicial power"
that is conferred by our Constitution."
Corbin's article elaborated upon his disdain, expressed years earlier, for
the "rules" and doctrines and generalizations of men, often (if not
always) based on quite insufficient life experience and inaccurate
observation, but solemnly repeated down the corridors of time....
[T]he meaning and value of any "rule" or generalization are wholly
dependent on the specific items of life experience and observation on
which they are based.
18
McDougal's contribution to Volume 50 was more topical. He argued,
among other things, for release from judicial restraint of those hard at work to
achieve certain humanitarian and democratic ideals shared by "most of us":
"[C]ivil liberties, social security, more goods to more people, healthful
housing, conservation and full utilization of resources, collective bargaining,
farm security, socialized medicine, protection of consumers, protection of
investors, cheaper and better administration of justice, and so on."' 9 In
McDougal's view, although the courts might be "indispensable ... for the
preservation of many of our old and continuing values," they are "utterly
helpless" when confronted by "many of our modem, complex problems,
requiring as they do ... a continuous and informed exercise of highly
specialized skills. 20
14. Walton H. Hamilton, Coal and the Economy-A Demurrer, 50 YALE LJ. 595 (1941); Hamilton
& Braden, supra note 3; Walton H. Hamilton, Trial by Ordeal, New Style, 50 YALE LJ. 778 (1941).
15. Myres S. MeDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 50 YALE LJ. 827
(1941).
16. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
17. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, supra note 13, at 777.
18. Quoted in TWINING, supra note 9, at 31.
19. MeDougal, supra note 15, at 836.
20. Id. at 837.
[Vol. 103: 5
Oberdorfer
These and other writings of the Yale faculty in the anniversary volume are
a rich source for any inquiry into the academic environment of the era. But
there were conspicuous omissions. Little in that volume (or the curriculum, as
recalled) addressed society's primordial concern about crime and a criminal
justice system that effectively coped;2' about civil rights, as distinct from civil
liberties; about the political and constitutional tensions inherent in Congress'
need to delegate broad administrative power to "nonpolitical" experts while
exercising appropriate oversight;' or about a principled method for choosing
between "our old and continuing values" as articulated in our written
Constitution and other values "requiring ... a continuous and informed
exercise of highly specialized skills. 23
Although by 1941 the wars abroad replaced the Depression as a "brooding
omnipresence," they were remote from the day-to-day life of the Law
School-until December 7, 1941. It is mind-boggling to recall Pearl Harbor
and the sudden plunge of the Class of 1942 from the warm, heady atmosphere
of the Sterling Law Building into the tough regimen and cold reality of global
war.
Classmates know little from White about his World War II experience.
Modest and reticent as he is, he is most modest and reticent about the war.
The intensity of his experience in the South Pacific can be gleaned from a
wartime news report about "his lone forays behind Japanese lines." According
to this report, "Lieut. Byron R. White's work in the Central Solomons may
never be publicized, but he may some day become the outstanding hero of this
War.
' ' 24
Later, while serving as Air Combat Intelligence Officer on the staff of
Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher during the U.S. invasion of the Philippines at
Leyte Gulf, White and a colleague persisted in their judgment about the
location of a formidable Japanese fleet, capable of great damage to the
invasion force. They persuaded their superiors to supplement a standard aerial
search that had failed to locate the elusive enemy fleet. The new
reconnaissance succeeded, enabling U.S. carrier planes to interdict the fleet and
destroy four carriers 5
A few weeks later, off Okinawa, the Bunker Hill, with Lieutenant White
and then-Commodore (later Admiral and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
Arleigh Burke aboard, was struck by two Kamikazes. After the episode Burke
wrote to his family:
21. Cf. David Riesman, Jr., Law and Social Science: A Report on Michael and Wechsler's Classbook
on Criminal Lmv and Administration, 50 YALE L.J. 636 (1941) (discussing criminal law with focus on its
relationship to social science).
22. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto).
23. McDougal, supra note 15, at 837; cf. Hamilton & Braden, supra note 3, at 1344-57.
24. Arthur Daley, The Whizzer Is Still a Whizzbang, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1944, at Cl.
25. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF 138-40 (1947).
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We were in Bunker Hill when she was hit. A good many of our staff
were killed .... and many others were wounded, and some suffered
from shock .... The fires were pretty bad, smoke was bad, and many
people suffocated. The ship was saved by some courageous fire
fighting.... There were some fine stories of bravery [that] came out
of that burning, exploding mess with gasoline fires all over the decks
... and tremendous explosions caused by our own bombs and
ammunition exploding. (Lieutenant B.R.) White [and two others]...
also fought fires and brought out suffocated men.... These men are
wonderful.26
After World War II, White delayed his return to the "real world" to
complete his interrupted law school career. The postwar law school term
featured the McDougal-Laswell addition to the jurisprudence of legal realism:
their course in Law, Science, and Policy "treated law and science 'as
instruments of public and private policy."'' 27 Forty years later, Professor
McDougal recalled that in that seminar "Byron and I did argue a lot, despite
our mutual respect and affection. 28
White followed graduation with a heady one-year tour as a law clerk to
Chief Justice Vinson, newly appointed to succeed Chief Justice Stone. Some
of the cases before the Court that Term have lived on as important reference
points: Adamson v. California,2 9 SEC v. Chenery Corp.,30 Everson v. Board
of Education,3' and Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber.32 The 1946
Term's clerks also witnessed the unfortunate personal tensions between some
Justices that grew out of the reported jockeying for position to succeed Chief
Justice Stone.33
The returning veterans who clerked during the Supreme Court's 1946
Term were not above some sophomoric l~se-majest6: one Saturday, the group
posed for a photograph in the courtroom, with Chief Justice Vinson's clerks
huddled around his chair and their colleagues arrayed accordingly up and down
the bench--only to be apprehended by the Marshal, who confiscated the film.
Roger Wollenberg, who clerked for Justice Douglas and was a fair country
26. Quoted in KEN JONES & HUBERT KELLEY, JR., ADMIRAL ARLEIGH (31-KNOT) BURKE: THE STORY
OF A FIGHTING SAILOR 144 (1962).
27. KALMAN, supra note 7, at 181.
28. Letter from Myres S. MeDougal to the author (July 13, 1987) (on file with author).
29. 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (refusing to incorporate Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
testimony into Fourteenth Amendment and rejecting Justice Black's contention that Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated entire Bill of Rights in haec verba. See id. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting)).
30. 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (rejecting any rigid requirement that a federal agency depend solely on
rulemaking as opposed to adjudication).
31. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (holding that, although "[the] wall between church and state.. . must be
kept high and impregnable," state funding for transportation of children to parochial schools does not
violate Establishment Clause).
32. 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (holding that electrocution after earlier, failed attempt violates neither Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, Double Jeopardy, nor Equal Protection Clause).
33. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE CoURT YEARS: 1937-1975, at 28-32 (1980).
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badminton player, recently recalled undertaking to teach White to play
badminton, only to lose the very first game. More than once during that Term,
the Marshal, swallowtail coat flying, broke up a badminton or basketball game
while the Court was in session-the gym was immediately above the
courtroom, where the games sounded, according to the Marshal, like distant
thunder.
After the clerkship interlude, White followed the majority of his classmates
into private practice. He practiced commercial litigation and counseling in
Denver with some specialization in antitrust and tax, enlivened by active
involvement with his life's partner, Marion, in the cultural, civic, and outdoor
life of postwar Denver and Colorado. A growing national reputation in the
legal profession was evidenced by his appointment by Chief Justice Warren to
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the 1960
Presidential campaign approached, White joined John Kennedy, who had been
a Navy colleague in the Pacific, to serve eventually as chairman of an
amorphous, but apparently effective, group entitled "Citizens for Kennedy."
President Kennedy's inaugural address reminded his generation of the
destiny President Roosevelt had prophesied for it twenty-five years before:
Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe
alike, that the torch has passed to a new generation of Americans,
born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter
peace, proud of our ancient heritage and unwilling to permit the slow
undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has already been
committed today at home and around the world.34
President Kennedy's generational reference may have been about himself, but
he was also describing White, whom he promptly appointed as Deputy to
Attorney General Robert Kennedy. As Deputy, White focused first on the
selection of United States Attorneys and federal judges-there were scores of
vacancies to be filled. He spearheaded law enforcement legislation that
extended federal courts' jurisdiction over interstate crime and expanded the
crime-detecting capability of the Department of Justice by means of court-
supervised electronic surveillance. Historians will discover several occasions
during his brief tenure in the Department when White stiffened law enforcers
and protected the independence of the Department's prosecutorial discretion. 35
In May 1961, President Kennedy dispatched Deputy Attorney General
White to Montgomery, Alabama, in command of a force of several hundred
34. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1961, at 1 (1961).
35. Indeed, Rex Lee, an early law clerk to Justice White, later Solicitor General, and most recently
president of Brigham Young University, views White's brief tenure in the Justice Department as having
had the greatest influence on his legal views on law enforcement, the state-federal relationship, antitrust,
and civil rights. See Rex E. Lee, A Case for "Whizzer White's" Greatness, NAT'L L.J., May 31, 1993, at
17.
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United States Marshals. Local police had permitted a mob to attack and injure
the intrepid Freedom Riders who were traveling by bus through the Deep
South. Judge Frank Johnson had enjoined the Ku Klux Klan from interfering
with the presence or safe passage of Freedom Riders in Montgomery and
enjoined local law enforcement officers to do their duty. But the local police
would not obey, much less enforce, his order. On the next evening, a mob
attacked and threatened to burn a church where Dr. Martin Luther King was
preaching with the Freedom Riders in the congregation. In the nick of time,
marshals deployed by White interdicted the mob until National Guard troops
arrived and cleared the area. The next day Deputy Attorney General White met
with Alabama Governor John Patterson in the State Capitol, where Jefferson
Davis took his oath as President of the Confederacy. White was a physically
formidable federal official, backed by his civilian force, with military units
alert and poised to move, confronting a Southern governor in his own office.
The Governor postured about federal interference with the state's sovereignty.
In reply, White coolly advised the Governor that the federal force would be
removed when the state resumed responsibility for the maintenance of law and
order.
From those widely publicized confrontations, on the street and in the
Governor's office, word went forth throughout the South that this generation
of Americans, having lived through the Depression and won the War, had the
will and the means to break, once and for all, the ugly undercurrent of violence
that had facilitated "massive resistance" to constitutional edicts and perpetuated
a cruel and archaic "way of life."
Predictably, when the next Supreme Court vacancy occurred, President
Kennedy appointed Deputy Attorney General White. This was before the era
of the "litmus test." Neither the President, the press, nor the Senate attempted
to inquire about the nominee's views on issues that might come before the
Court. In announcing White's nomination, President Kennedy said simply:
I have known Mr. White for over 30 years. His character, experience
and intellectual force qualify him superbly for service on the nation's
highest tribunal .... He has excelled in anything he has attempted-in
his academic life, in his military service, in his career before the war
and in the Federal Government-and I know he will excel on the
highest court in the land.36
Shortly after Justice White was appointed to the Court, a mutual friend asked
John McNally, the erudite and well-informed former coach and forever
friend,37 what kind of judge he expected White to be. McNally replied with
36. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1962, at 283
(1962).
37. John Doar, a relative of McNally and a colleague of White at the Justice Department, published
a poignant memorial to McNally. The last item is a note McNally received the day before he died:
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a loose paraphrase of Polonius' advice to his son:38 "Byron will be
Byron."
39
Scholars and historians seeking to profile Justice White will search in vain
for autobiographical expositions of his judicial philosophy, or much else about
him.n" Many of his published statements have been tributes to others such as
Dean Sturges,41 Justice Stewart,42 and Justice Brennan. 43 Of each Justice
White frequently said something that others might well have said about him.
A tribute to Justice Stewart applauded his ability "to moderate speed changes
of a machine subject to fluctuations in drive and load."'  Likewise, White
more frequently than some of his colleagues slowed the Court when he thought
it was going too fast or too far; on other occasions he functioned as an
accelerator.
Arriving at the Court from Robert Kennedy's law-enforcement-oriented
Justice Department, he gave early notice to a Court strongly committed to
redressing a perceived imbalance in criminal cases that he was "unwilling to
sweep ... under the rug" the "festering problem" of crime.45 For him, the
criminal justice system involved "[m]ore than the human dignity of the
accused"; the Court should give "equal weight" to "society's interest in the
general security.,46 In one of his earliest opinions, dissenting from a holding
that punishment for drug addiction violated the Eighth Amendment, he
admonished his new colleagues (several of whom had been Justices when he
was a law clerk)47:
John old friend,
I wish I could be there to see you again. Our friendship has meant a lot to me. I treasure
it, there are so many good memories. Marion sends her love to you. She would like to be there.
Goodbye, John, and save a place for me.
Byron.
38.
To thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET act 1, sc. 2. Earlier in that same scene, Polonius also
advised:
Give every man thy ear, but few thy voice,
Take each man's censure, but reserve thy judgment.
ld.
39. Telephone conversation with John Doar (Aug. 9, 1993).
40. An early exception is an extensive interview in Sports Illustrated shortly after his appointment.
See Alfred Wright, A Modest All-America Who Sits on the Highest Bench, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 10,
1962, at 85.
41. White, To Students, supra note 12.
42. Byron R. White, Excerpts from Introductory Remarks to the Sesquicentennial Keynote Address
(Nov. 2, 1974), in YALE L. REP., Winter 1974-75, at 8 [hereinafter White, Excerpts].
43. Byron R. White, Tribute to the Honorable William J. Brennan, Jr., 100 YALE L.J. 1113 (1991)
[hereinafter White, Tribute].
44. White, Excerpts, supra note 42, at 8.
45. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
46. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 537 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
47. White was the first Justice to have served earlier as a Supreme Court law clerk. Justices Black,
Frankfurter, and Douglas were sitting then and when white was appointed in 1962.
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If this case involved economic regulation, the present Court's allergy
to substantive due process would surely save the statute and prevent
the Court from imposing its own philosophical predilections upon
state legislatures or Congress. I fail to see why the Court deems it
more appropriate to write into the Constitution its own abstract
notions of how best to handle the narcotics problem, for it obviousl,
cannot match either the States or Congress in expert understanding.4'
On the other hand, Justice White accelerated the Court's attack on the
vestiges of school segregation-from his votes for the orders of the 1960's to
eliminate school segregation "root and branch, ' 49 to his 1990 opinion for the
Court invoking the Supremacy Clause to suspend a state law limiting school
district expenditures mandated by court order.50 However, in employment
discrimination cases, either White and a Court majority misread Congress, or
Congress changed its mind, about the extent to which it intended to
compensate for past discrimination and to give some litigation advantages to
plaintiffs in those cases.-5
In an affectionate, respectful tribute to Justice Brennan upon his retirement,
Justice White wrote: "In interpreting the majestic, open-ended clauses of the
Constitution, to be forever bound by the perhaps undiscoverable intent of the
Framers was not for him."5" White's analysis of the Due Process Clause and
the Fourth and Eighth Amendments afforded him many occasions to illuminate
the great clauses using some of the analytic tools of the legal realists. From
Massiah53 and Miranda54 in the 1960's to Moore55 and Furman56 in the
1970's and most recently in Harmelin57 and Dixon,58 White has applied to
those clauses elements of prewar legal realism: a commitment to fact-based,
commonsense, common-law decisions, a palpable consciousness of historical
and practical limits to the Court's role, and an aversion to rote, rule-bound
decisionmaking. He was loathe to treat any of the great clauses as absolute,
including particularly the First Amendment. 9 White's tribute to Brennan
gently alluded to the two Justices' differences of opinion about First
Amendment issues, particularly to White's perception that freedom for the
48. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 689 (1962) (White, J., dissenting). In White's view, the
Court could and should have avoided this frontier constitutional issue by construing the statute as
proscribing the illegal use of narcotics rather than the condition of addiction.
49. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
50. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
51. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
52. White, Tribute, supra note 43, at 1116.
53. 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
54. 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
55. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
56. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
57. Harmelin v. Michigan, Ill S. Ct. 2680, 2709 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
58. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2868 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
59. Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) ("I read 'no law ...
abridging' to mean no law abridging.").
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media had gone too far.60 He voted to reinstate the death penalty only after
state legislatures satisfied the pragmatic concerns that had earlier led him to
vote to strike it down. 61 He urged his colleagues to "uphold constitutional
principles" and not adopt a blanket rule that disproportionate prison sentences
were beyond the reach of the Eighth Amendment even though "such scrutiny
requires sensitivity to federalism concerns and involves analysis that may at
times be difficult."
62
His Miranda dissent early summarized what scholars and historians may
find to be the keynote of Justice White's constitutional decisionmaking
process, his "constitutional vision, 63 if you will:
At the very least the Court's text and reasoning should withstand
analysis and be a fair exposition of the constitutional provision which
its opinion interprets. Decisions like these cannot rest alone on
syllogism, metaphysics or some ill-defined notions of natural justice,
although each will perhaps play its part. In proceeding to such
constructions... the Court should also duly consider all the factors
and interests bearing upon the cases ... [T]he Court should not
proceed to formulate fundamental policies based on speculation
alone.'4
In midcareer, he restated this proposition as common ground between the often
contending views of Justice Black and Justice Harlan about the scope of the
Due Process Clause:
Although the Court regularly proceeds on the assumption that the
Due Process Clause has more than a procedural dimension [so that]
the Court has ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional
rights, [that fact] should not lead it to repeat the process at will ....
[T]he Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further
substantive content into the Due Process Clause ... 65
Suffice it to say that cases involving controversial issues such as abortion 66
and sodomy,67 where the constitutional command was, at best, vague and
about which the political process and mores of the times were, to say the least,
in flux, to create new constitutional rights out of emanations and penumbras
60. White, Tribute, supra note 43, at 1114, 1116.
61. Compare Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 153 (1976) (White, J., concurring) with Furman, 408
U.S. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
62. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2714 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (objecting to Court's
denial of proportionality guarantee under Eighth Amendment).
63. Cf Jeffrey Rosen, The Next Justice, NEWv REPUBLIC, Apr. 12, 1993, at 21 (Justice White
"uninterested in articulating a constitutional vision").
64. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 531-32.
65. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543-44 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
66. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
67. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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confected from a mixture of several clauses, the Ninth Amendment, and
phrases from the Preamble was not for him.
The flag of a realistic, common-law constitutionalist still flew over his
final opinions. In one last dissent,68 he took vigorous exception to what he
considered exposure of a defendant to impermissible double jeopardy. He
criticized "an overly technical interpretation" 69 and "exclusive focus on the
formal elements of the relevant offenses." 70 The Court had, in his view,
reached a "result that is as unjustified as it is pernicious,"'" stemming, he
believed, "from a 'hypertechnical and archaic approach.'
72
In addition to his signed opinions and dissents, Justice White has been the
Court's sentinel, on the alert to resolve conflicts between circuits and other
sources of confusion to lower courts, the bar, and litigants.73 He has done an
extra share of the heavy lifting required for the administration of the Court's
burdensome original jurisdiction, particularly state boundary and complex
water rights disputes.74 In recent years he and Justice Brennan were the
Court's institutional memory and the source of its "internal common law.
75
White's Sturges-like analyses reportedly illuminated conferences and the vital
written colloquies between chambers. He neither delivered any time-
consuming, self-serving lectures nor lent his name to any revealing interviews
or income-supplementing books. He has not doggedly pursued ideological
causes. He has had no leaky law clerks. There have been no serious public
feuds during his tenure; the Court gives the appearance of remarkable
collegiality, for which White must share credit. Most important, he has
jealously guarded the credibility of the Court, husbanding its power, alert to
the "limits of tolerance to judicial discretion" that the legal realists had
perceived after the judicial overreaching of the 1930's.76
Justice White brought to the Court the very best that his generation
produced by way of sheer intellectual power, a superb and sophisticated
education, battle-tested courage, the ability of a world-class team player to be
both competitive and collegial, exquisitely good judgment, indefatigable
capacity to work and concentrate, a perfectionist's attention to detail, a habit
of successful achievement, and a rich experience of living and working at the
68. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2868 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2869.
70. Id. at 2874.
71. Id. at 2878.
72. Id. (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970)).
73. See, e.g., Sewell v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1367 (1993) (sixth dissent from denial of writ of
certiorari to resolve conflict of circuits as to whether weight of illegal drug should include waste by-
products).
74. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789 (1992); Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 111 S. Ct.
2281 (1991).
75. White, Tribute, supra note 43, at 1115.
76. Hamilton & Braden, supra note 3, at 1322; cf., e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 221-23




cutting edge of his generation's rendezvous with destiny. Justice White's work
on the Court clearly reflects the influence of the legal realists of Yale. But to
pigeonhole Justice White as a practicing legal realist would overstate the reach
of realist jurisprudence while oversimplifying the complexity of the man, his
work, and the times. For example, some legal realists were dismayed by
White's interpretations of the Establishment Clause.77 Nevertheless, scholars
and historians who take the time to put it all together might take as a point of
departure the eyewitness judgment of Justice Douglas, a staunch legal realist
who shared the bench with Justice White for more than a dozen years and who
very frequently disagreed with him. Justice Douglas included Byron White on
his "All-American team" of justices with whom he had served, a list he
intended to reflect "not an ideological line, but basic ability and judicial
attitude. These Justices would have adorned any Court in our history.""
Scholars and historians will likely conclude that John Kennedy and John
McNally both had it right: Byron was Byron-and during his thirty-one years
on the Court, he excelled in his service to it, the Constitution, and the Nation.
77. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 661 (1971) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (contending that Establishment Clause does not prohibit government funding of secular education
within religious schools); cf. id. at 625, 641-42 (Douglas, J., concurring for himself and Justice Black)
("Maxpayers' forced contribution to the parochial schools ... violates the First Amendment.").
78. DOUGLAS, supra note 33, at 42. The others on the list included, alphabetically, Hugo Black,
William Brennan, Felix Frankfurter, John Harlan, Charles Evans Hughes, and Earl Warren.
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